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151 C.:!d 471; 334 P.2d 5691

[L. A. No. 25209. In BRnk. Ff'b. 2,1959.]

DONALD A. COY, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF
LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent.
[1] Witnesses - Privileged Communications - Public Officers.hen the Prosecution seeks to show reasonable cause for a
search by testimony as to communications from an informer,
either the identity of the informer must be disclosed when
defendant seeks disclosure or such testimony must be struck
on proper motion by defendant.
[2] Id.-Privileged Communications-Public Officers.-Where no
motion to strike a police officer's testimony at the preliminary
hearing of a narcotics case was made after disclosure of the
identity of an informer was refused, and neither in his objection to the introduction of the narcotics in evidence nor by
argument elsewhere did defendant indicate that he was relying on refusal to identify the informer to establish illegality
of the arrest and search, the magistrate did not err in sustaining an objection to thc question asking the informer's identity,
since the prosecution was entitled to elect between disclosure
and having the officer's testimony struck, and it was incumbent
on defendant to compel this election by moving to strike or
otherwise making his position clear.

,V

PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the· Superior
Court of Los Angeles County from trying a criminal case.
Writ denied.
John P. Brown and J. C. Radzik for Petitioner.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, William B. McKesBon, District Attorney (Los Angeles), Ralph F. Bagley,
Jere J. Sullivan, Lewis Watnick and Robert Lederman,
Deputy District Attorneys, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR J.-An information filed by the District Attorney of Los Angeles County charged defendant with possessing
narcotics in violation of Health and Safety Code, section
11500. His motion to set aside the information under Penal
Code, section 995, was denied, and he now seeks a writ of
prohibition to prevent his trial.
On June 11, 1958, Officer Hill of the Los Angeles Police
Department Narcotics Division received information from a
[1] See Cal.Jur., Witnesses, § 31 j Am.Jur., Witnesses, §§ 535,
536.
KcK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Witnesses, § 60.
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confidential informer that defendant was in possession of narcotics and that the room he occupied in a rooming house was
being used as a "shooting gallery," a place where addicts
congregate to use narcotics. The informer accompanied
Officers Hill and Loreste to the neighborhood of the rooming
house and pointed out the building and the room defendant
occupied.
An hour or so later, the officers entered the rooming house
with the permission of the landlady, who accompanied them
upstairs to defendant's room. As they approached the room,
the door opened and defendant emerged dressed in a bathrobe.
The landlady indicated that he was the person the officers
had inquired about, and they placed him under arrest. The
officers had no warrant. When the officers searched defendant's person after the arrest, they found narcotics and paraphernalia for their use in the pockets of his bathrobe.
Defendant admitted that the narcotics were his, that he had
purchased them that morning, and that he was on his way to
the bathroom to take a fix.
The informer was not present at the arrest, and took no
other part than to supply information of defendant's possession and show the officers the location of defendant's residence.
At the preliminary hearing, Officer Hill testified to the foregoing facts. He also testified that the informer had provided
accurate information in the past that led to the arrest of three
persons for unlawful possession of narcotics. He stated that
in his opinion the informer was a reliable source of information and that he had relied upon him in making the arrest
in the present case.
On cross-examination, Officer Hill was asked the identity
of the informer. The prosecution's objection was sustained
on the ground that the informer's identity was privileged.
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 1881, subd. 5.) After the cross-examination, the prosecution sought to introduce into evidence the
narcotics found on defendant's person after the arrest.
Defendant's objection on the ground that they had been
obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure was overruled. Defendant was committed and held for trial and his
motion to set aside the commitment was denied.
.
Defendaut contends that since the identity of the informer
was not disclosed, the officers could not justify the arrest on
the basis of the informer's information; that the arrest was
therefore illegal and the evidence obtained as a result thereof
inadmissible; and that accordingly the writ should issue sinee
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there was no competent evidence to support the commitment.
(Priestly v. Sttperior Court, 50 Ca1.2d 812, 815 [330 P.2d 39] ;
Ba.dillo v. Superior Court, 46 Ca1.2d 269, 271 [294 P.2d 23].)
[1] In the Priestly case we held that "when the prosecution
seeks to show reasonable cause for a search by testimony as
to communications from an informer, either the identity of
the informer must be disclosed when the defendant seeks
disclosure or such testimony must be struck on propcr motion
of the defendant." (50 Ca1.2d at 819.)
[2] In the present ease no motion to strike the officer's
testimony was made after the identity of the informer was
refused, and neither in his objection to the introduction of the
narcotics in evidence nor by argument elsewhere in the record
did defendant indicate that he was relying on the refusal to
identify the informer to establish the illegality of the arrest
and search. The magistrate did not err in sustaining the
objection to the question asking the identity of the informer,
for the prosecution was entitled to elect between disclosure
and having the officer's testimony struck. It was incumbent on defendant to compel this election, however, by
nloving to strike or otherwise making his position clear. The
prosecution may have had evidence other than the information of the informer to justify the search or it may have been
willing to waive the privilege of nondisclosure if its case would
otherwise fail, and it was entitled to an opportunity to produce
such evidence or waive nondisclosure. It was not called upon
to do 80, however, while evidence of reasonable cause stood
unchallenged in the record. To hold that the magistrate
or trial court must strike the evidence on its own motion
when the objection to it has not been called to its attention
would open the door to needless repetitions of preliminary
bearings. It would also permit the defendant to gamble on
an acquittal at his trial secure in the knowledge that a con"iction would be reversed on appeal and a new trial ordered.
No nndue burden is placed on the defendant by requiring
him to make a motion to strike when the basis for excluding evidence theretofore properly admitted becom('s apparent,
and there is no basis for departing from the settled rule
requiring such a motion (City of Venice v. Short Li'IJ.c Beach
Land Co. (1919), 180 Cal. 447, 453 [181 P. 658] ; Ballos v.
Na·l1mll (1928),93 Ca1.App. 601, 608 [269 P. 972] ; Brandt v.
ll"v!lh (l!JI0), 14 Ca1.App. 39, 56 [111 P. 275J ; Fricke, California Criminal Evidence, 444-445 (4th ed. 1957» in the
present situation.
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The alternative writ is discharged and the peremptory writ
is denied.
Gibson, C. J., Carter J., Schauer, J., Sp<'ucc, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
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